Our Terms & Conditions | Our Privacy Policy
Yeo Lay Hwee examines the European Union’s recent election outcomes and how ASEAN and the EU are navigating a shifting geopolitical landscape.
The prediction by political pundits in several media outlets of a far-right sweep of the European Parliament (EP) did not materialise. The 2024 European elections delivered an EP that remains under centrist control by the European People’s Party (EPP), Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and Renew Europe groups, with a total vote share of around 56 per cent. The Greens suffered a fairly significant drop in support, retaining only 53 of the 74 seats that they controlled in the 2019 elections. The far-right controlled 187 out of 720 seats (about 26 per cent of the votes).
The current President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has been reappointed for another five-year term (2024-2029). A German, she belongs to the EPP, the largest party in the EP, with 188 seats. The centrists in the Parliament celebrated her confirmation as a victory for pro-Europeans. EP President Roberta Metsola, from Malta and from von der Leyen’s party, will also retain her position.
The new faces in the EU leadership are the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the EU’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). Former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa will replace Charles Michel as President and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas will take over from Josep Borrell as HR/VP.
One should predict a degree of continuity in EU’s policy directions since this is not an entirely new slate, but there are a few things that ASEAN should keep an eye on as it seeks to work with the EU to strengthen relations.
First, ASEAN needs to pay more attention to the EP. The EP is an EU institution that is perhaps least understood by the EU’s external partners because of its relatively limited role in foreign policy. It has over the years with each treaty change taken on a more important role as co-legislator, however, and its consent or vote is needed for many of the EU executive’s plans. For instance, EP ratification is needed for international trade agreements to take effect.
While the far right did not make spectacular gains in the recent elections to shift the political balance and upend the broad pro-EU centrist majority, it has been strengthened as Eurosceptic voices made significant inroads into European discourses. A new political group with 25 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), called the “Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN)” and led by the radical German party, AfD (Alternativ fur Deutschland) cobbled together radical parties opposed to migration, the Green Deal, social progressivism and military assistance to Ukraine. This set them on a collision course with the mainstream.
Rassemblement National (RN), the French far-right party led by Marie Le Pen, formed a new political group named “Patriots for Europe”, which includes Hungary’s ruling party Fidesz led by Viktor Orban. This political group is now the third largest group in the EP after EPP and S&D. While not as “radical” as the ESN, their positions on migration, the war in Ukraine are not in line with those of the centrist parties.
A photo of EU and ASEAN leaders during the Opening Ceremony of the 24th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 2 February 2024 in Brussels, Belgium. (Photo by European Council).
ASEAN has in recent years been feeling the “Brussels effect” of EU regulations such as the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). ASEAN member states (AMS) may be wondering if there will be more EU legislation in the pipeline that would impact ASEAN’s trade with the 27-country grouping. These legislations may come as a result of the influence of the nationalistic and anti-globalisation forces within the Parliament.
Second, ASEAN must contend with a far more “realist” Europe. In her first speech in Parliament as the President of the European Commission in 2019, von der Leyen set out the College of Commissioners’ policy agenda, promising that her team would be the “geopolitical Commission” that Europe urgently needed – a Europe that will shape a better global order and use its leadership to be a force for good and positive change, and a champion of multilateralism.
However, the war in Ukraine and the rise of the far right in the EU has transformed it into a far more hard-nosed realist. ASEAN once saw the EU as its most trusted partner to champion open and free trade and support for the rules-based order. This view is now in decline. The EU’s close alliance with the US and the outbreak of the Gaza war have led some AMS to question the EU’s strategic autonomy and perceived double standards.
In light of the above, how should ASEAN position itself and what can it realistically expect from the EU, a longstanding and now strategic partner? Despite being preoccupied with the existential threat posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU recognises the importance of the Indo-Pacific. Its 2021 Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific singled out ASEAN as an important partner. The EU’s Special Envoy for the Indo-Pacific, Richard Tibbels, has made significant efforts to visit the region and to understand its priorities and perspectives. However, the stepping up of diplomatic engagements has yet to translate into concrete cooperation that would truly exemplify the much touted “strategic partnership” that the EU and ASEAN forged in December 2020.
Following the release of its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021 and the convening of the first Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum in Paris in February 2022 under the French presidency, there was optimism that the two strategic partners would identify priority areas for action. Unfortunately, the momentum was derailed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has since dominated the EU’s agenda. The fact that not all AMS voted for the UN resolution condemning Russia’s actions, along with attempts by the EU to draw parallels between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and potential Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait, has further complicated strategic engagement.
The closer alignment between the EU and the US in confronting Russia coupled with the EU’s own rising tensions with China have created a strategic dilemma for ASEAN. ASEAN has long seen the EU as a trusted partner to champion the rule of law, strengthen multilateralism and promote a multilateral rules-based order. However, a more geopolitical and realist Europe is re-adjusting its engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, with more emphasis on bilateral engagements and shifting attention away from ASEAN to partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and selected ASEAN countries such as the Philippines.
The appointment of Kaja Kallas from Estonia as the HR/VP responsible for the EU’s foreign affairs may exacerbate the shift away from ASEAN. With Kallas’ limited experience in Asia and her intense focus on Russia, a lower priority might be accorded to geographically distant Southeast Asia.
Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.
Images are for reference only.Images and contents gathered automatic from google or 3rd party sources.All rights on the images and contents are with their legal original owners.
Aggregated From –
Comments are closed.