EU migration strategy faces resistance from North Africa

The European Union’s ambitious migration pact has encountered a serious challenge: Egypt and Tunisia, two key North African partners, are pushing back on enhanced border control and migrant return agreements. Despite the EU’s substantial investments and carefully crafted policies, these countries are showing signs of disinterest in aligning fully with Brussels’ migration management plans. This reluctance could disrupt the EU’s broader strategy and cast doubt on the viability of its migration pact, a framework that relies on collaboration with neighboring countries to intercept and redirect migrant flows before they reach Europe.

The EU’s approach to irregular migration has increasingly involved relying on third-party countries, particularly North African states, to serve as buffers. By striking deals with Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco, Brussels aims to outsource much of the responsibility for managing migration flows, effectively transforming these nations into gatekeepers for “Fortress Europe.” This strategy, on paper, allows the EU to manage its borders without direct intervention, minimizing the pressure on its internal systems and member states, especially those on the Mediterranean frontline like Italy and Greece.

However, the EU’s reliance on external agreements to resolve what are essentially internal issues has proven risky. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, introduced to create a unified approach to migration, is now jeopardized by the resistance of key partner countries. Leaked documents have revealed that Egypt and Tunisia are far less enthusiastic about deepening cooperation, signaling that the EU’s plan may be more fragile than anticipated.

There are indications that the North African countries’ reluctance may be a strategic move. As migration becomes an increasingly contentious issue within Europe, countries like Egypt and Tunisia find themselves in a unique bargaining position. Their role as key transit points for migrants seeking entry to Europe gives them leverage, and they appear to be using this opportunity to extract greater concessions from Brussels. The stakes are high for both sides. On one hand, the EU is keen to maintain its externalized border strategy; on the other, Cairo and Tunis are weighing their national interests and the potential benefits of cooperating with Europe.

The EU has already invested billions of euros in financial assistance to these countries. Tunisia, for instance, receives significant aid from Brussels, aimed at bolstering its border infrastructure and capabilities. But the resources provided may not be enough to offset the complex challenges these countries face. Managing migration flows involves not only infrastructure but also human resources, security measures, and logistical support that go beyond what current EU funds cover. Egypt and Tunisia are acutely aware of the long-term costs and burdens associated with such agreements, and they are in no rush to deepen their commitments without securing terms that genuinely benefit them.

The EU’s focus on externalizing its migration issues has always been a double-edged sword. By depending heavily on third-party countries to manage migrant flows, the EU has placed a critical component of its migration policy in the hands of nations that may not share its priorities. Egypt and Tunisia’s recent pushback highlights a fundamental flaw in this approach: it assumes that external partners will align with EU interests out of mutual benefit or financial incentive. In reality, these countries have their own priorities, and migration management may not rank as highly as Europe would like.

The EU’s policy framework also risks creating friction among its own member states. If Egypt and Tunisia continue to resist, the resulting gaps in the EU’s “buffer zone” will force frontline countries like Italy and Greece to bear the brunt of the incoming migrants. This could lead to unilateral actions by individual EU countries, undermining the unity the migration pact seeks to achieve. Rising asylum claims – potentially reaching 1 million this year – only amplify the pressure, as member states debate how to manage resources and responsibilities fairly.

Moreover, the EU’s handling of migration could influence its global relationships. Countries outside Europe may view Brussels’ offers as coercive or dismissive of their own national issues. An insistence on delegating Europe’s migration challenges could lead partners to question whether the EU’s cooperation offers are reliable or self-serving, further straining already delicate diplomatic ties.

The resistance from Cairo and Tunis signals a deeper problem with the EU’s externalization model. The pact’s reliance on external partners means that any shift in political will from these countries has the potential to undermine the entire framework. If other transit countries, such as Libya or Morocco, decide to follow suit, the EU could face an unmanageable migration crisis. The potential for a domino effect is real: if transit countries no longer act as gatekeepers, irregular migration could increase substantially, creating political unrest within the EU and emboldening nationalist, anti-immigration movements.

Tunisia’s emergence as a migration hub exemplifies the challenges the EU faces. The country has transformed into a critical transit point, which does not align with Brussels’ goals. Should this trend continue, it will force the EU to confront the reality that without genuine cooperation from North African partners, the migration pact cannot achieve its objectives. This development could fuel a surge of public dissatisfaction across the EU, eroding trust in Brussels’ capacity to manage migration and potentially fracturing consensus on the union’s common policies.

The setbacks with Egypt and Tunisia present the EU with a clear choice: adapt its approach or risk failure. Relying solely on external countries to manage migration is proving unsustainable. If Brussels wants to avoid repeating past mistakes, it will need to consider a more nuanced, sustainable strategy that addresses the underlying factors driving migration rather than merely shifting the burden onto third-party countries.

One path forward could involve offering partner nations robust economic incentives and joint projects that ensure tangible benefits for both sides. Instead of focusing solely on border control, the EU could work with North African countries on initiatives that address root causes of migration, including economic instability and lack of opportunities. This would require a shift from treating these nations as mere border buffers to recognizing them as true partners whose prosperity directly influences Europe’s stability.

The EU must also face the moral dimensions of its strategy. The current approach has been criticized for enabling human rights abuses in countries where EU funds support controversial security practices. By focusing on building resilience within these nations – instead of enforcing restrictive migration controls – the EU could construct a policy that aligns with its stated values of human rights and solidarity.

As migration routes evolve and the EU navigates an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, the coming months will test whether the bloc’s migration pact can withstand the pressures of external resistance and internal division. Will the EU reframe its approach and foster partnerships built on trust and mutual benefit, or will it continue down a path that may only aggravate the migration issue?

Only time will tell. But one thing is clear: the current model of relying on external countries to stem migration is no longer sufficient. The EU must adapt to a new reality, one that recognizes the sovereignty and agency of its partners. Otherwise, it risks perpetuating the very challenges it seeks to solve, casting doubt on its own vision for a unified and resilient Europe.

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Anita Mathur is a Special Contributor to Blitz.

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