Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas

Report

September 13, 2024 • 12:00 am ET

Print this page

Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas

By
Eser Özdil

This chapter is part of a report on the prospects for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Western countries in the Black Sea region in the new geopolitical setting following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Strategic assessment

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has undergone a profound transformation in its energy policy to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. In this evolving policy landscape, Turkey has emerged as a key partner, strategically positioned to curb Russian commercial influence in Europe and the Black Sea region while maintaining its balancing act. In this vein, the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory advancements, exemplified by the REPowerEU plan, the EU Toolbox, and the European Green Deal, have significantly reshaped energy procurement strategies, emphasizing diversification and security. Turkey’s recent natural gas export agreements, primarily those with Moldova, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, underline its critical role in enhancing European energy resiliency. Moreover, Turkey’s robust liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and its potential for future projects fortify the energy security of both European nations and Black Sea littoral states. Crucially, Turkey’s nuanced balancing act in its foreign policy, encapsulated in its natural gas policy, deftly integrates price rationality with geopolitical strategy, enabling it to govern complex international dynamics effectively. Turkey’s approach ensures flexibility in energy sourcing, thus reducing dependency on any single supplier while leveraging the country’s geopolitical position to establish a resilient energy policy. This policy is characterized by agility and adaptability, responding swiftly to regional and global natural gas trade, and enabling Turkey to navigate the fast-changing dynamics in natural gas policymaking. Last but not least, even with flexibility tools like LNG terminals and/or underground storage, high-level dependency in imports on a single supplier poses energy security risks. Since securing LNG and pipe gas quickly is not possible, creating a balanced import portfolio secures countries from short-term energy shocks, which may have destructive effects on market participants. As Turkey has also been developing nuclear projects with Russia, a delicate balance in its energy relations should be carefully maintained.

Preinvasion state of natural gas trade between Europe and Russia

Understanding the evolution of the European natural gas strategy provides important context for Turkey’s ongoing ties with EU nations, especially given the direct implications for EU gas supplies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU relied heavily on Russian natural gas, representing 40 percent of imports, or 150 billion cubic meters (bcm), in 2020.

With a total annual gas demand of approximately 400 bcm, the EU sourced only 10 percent domestically, and supported limited LNG infrastructure, before the war in Ukraine. In 2021, the EU imported 155 bcm of natural gas from Russia, with the number dropping to 80 bcm in 2022, and 43 bcm in 2023. As a percentage, the EU’s reliance on Russian gas has decreased from 45 percent of total imports in 2021 to 15 percent in 2023. These radical policy measures, supported by technical and commercial actions, represent the EU’s renewed strategy against reliance on Russian gas.

During this period, the EU initiated a strategic transition from pipeline gas to LNG, with US LNG imports accounting for 44 percent in 2022 and 48 percent in 2023. Qatar, Algeria, and Nigeria have also become significant LNG suppliers, contributing 12.1 percent, 9.4 percent, and 5.6 percent, respectively. Despite a total reduction in pipeline gas imports, EU countries still received 17.8 bcm of LNG from Russia in 2023, representing 6.1 percent of total gas demand. In the infrastructural axis, the EU continues to sustain its ambitious investment plans for expanding LNG import capacity.

In line with the ongoing high investments in LNG infrastructure, the EU increased its LNG import capacity by 40 bcm in 2023, with plans to add another 30 bcm by 2024, though this infrastructure is still under construction. The share of LNG in the EU’s gas supply rose from 20 percent in 2021 to 41 percent in 2023, reflecting a radical diversification of energy sources in response to the conflict in Ukraine.

Importantly, while the EU continues to purchase Russian LNG via Novatek, the fourteenth sanction package, which was established in June 2024, fully prohibits all forms of reexport agreements. This measure will prevent Russian LNG carriers from utilizing the EU’s developed LNG infrastructure in the near future.

Finally, the majority of the EU’s dependence on Russian gas was based on long-term natural gas pipelines. Notably, historical pipeline agreements, such as the Gazprom-Naftogaz deal, allowed Russian gas transit through Ukraine. This $7 billion agreement aimed to transit 225 bcm from 2020 to 2024. Post-invasion reductions led Naftogaz to seek international arbitration against Gazprom, and the collaboration will no longer exist after 2024.

Other widely discussed and criticized projects within the EU were Germany’s Nord Stream pipelines, which have become inoperable. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline began operations in 2011, and the proposed Nord Stream 2 aimed to double the capacity to 110 bcm per year. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz initially supported Nord Stream 2, like his predecessor, Angela Merkel, despite warnings from the United States, which argued that the project created a power asymmetry in favor of Russia. Despite significant technical discussions on this asymmetry within the transatlantic community, the project was halted only following the invasion. The damage to Nord Stream 2 and the cessation of Nord Stream 1 exposed vulnerabilities in Germany’s gas supply, prompting the EU to rapidly increase investments in LNG infrastructure.

The EU’s legislative actions to diminish reliance on Russian natural gas

In October 2021, the European Commission introduced a comprehensive “toolbox” designed to help EU member states address rising energy prices and bolster energy supply security by reducing dependence on Russian natural gas. Key measures included enhancing gas storage efficiency, establishing a collective gas purchasing platform, and reassessing the EU’s electricity market with the support of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).

In April 2022, the EU launched the EU Energy Platform to focus on demand aggregation, joint purchasing of non-Russian gas, efficient use of natural gas infrastructure, and extensive international outreach. This platform aims to mitigate intra-EU competition, diversify supply chains, and reduce reliance on Russian energy sources in a coordinated and multilateral manner.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European nations, particularly Germany, intensified efforts under the REPowerEU plan to reduce dependence on Russian gas. Introduced in May 2022, REPowerEU aims to eliminate reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2027 by emphasizing energy efficiency, transitioning to renewable energy sources, and diversifying natural gas imports. These policy measures include nationalizing Gazprom’s storage facilities to safeguard German national security.

In conjunction with the regulatory restrictions on Russian facilities, the EU updated the Renewable Energy Directive, setting a 45 percent renewable energy target by 2030. The European Commission’s classification of natural gas as “green” facilitated the expansion of LNG import capacity, aligning with REPowerEU’s objectives for non-Russian gas procurement. Clearly, the EU has implemented a comprehensive and systematic policy program that combines the EU Toolbox with the REPowerEU plan.

Evolution of Germany’s natural gas tactics

Reflecting current geopolitical power shifts and energy security concerns within the EU, there exists a concerted multilateral effort and intergovernmental approach to reducing Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas through a variety of measures. Nevertheless, Germany’s energy policy has notably differed from those of other European nations—reflecting a unique relationship with Russia over time and overlooking the importance of energy diversification in favor of strategic use of materials, primarily pipelines, in its natural gas trade, initially with the USSR and subsequently with the Russian Federation.
 
By 1981, Germany’s natural gas trade with the USSR had reached 17.2 bcm, without any substantial local technical improvements. Another critical twenty-five-year contract in 1981 established an annual export of 10.5 bcm. After the Berlin Wall fell and Germany reunified, the USSR began supplying about 30 percent of West Germany’s natural gas needs. By 1990, Soviet gas exports to Western Europe had grown drastically to 63 bcm.

During this period, Germany faced two significant political-economic challenges in its dealings with Russia. First, the USSR engaged in barter trade, exchanging natural gas for steel pipes, pipe-laying equipment, and other related infrastructure materials with Germany via its companies. Second, Germany leveraged its robust domestic iron and steel sectors to secure cheap Russian natural gas, which it then sold to its European allies.

This approach greatly expanded Germany’s economic reach and indirectly subsidized gas prices for other European countries by maintaining dependence on Russia as the primary natural gas source. A similar mindset prevailed in many Germany-Russia natural gas projects—until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted a significant shift.

End of an era: Russia’s 2022 invasion cuts historic gas bonds with Germany

Germany’s reliance on Russian natural gas, a legacy of the USSR-era pipe-for-gas agreements, conflicts with the essential principle of energy diversification. It is best exemplified by its pre-invasion support for Nord Stream 1 and 2, which represented a total capacity of 110 bcm yearly and would have made Germany unilaterally dependent on Russian gas as a single source, without alternative investments such as LNG infrastructure and gas storage. Germany’s reassessment led to the implementation of the EU Toolbox and REPowerEU, which are aligned with the Green Deal’s targets and green economic model.

In reaction to escalating energy security concerns, Germany has accelerated its diversification efforts by investing in LNG infrastructure, notably acquiring four floating LNG storage and liquefaction facilities. In aggregate, Europe’s LNG investment is poised for considerable expansion. Currently, there are thirty-seven operational import terminals: eight newly commissioned, four expanded in 2022 and 2023, thirteen new terminal projects under construction, and four existing facilities with planned expansions.

Turkey and Germany: Contrasting approaches to natural gas

Within the transatlantic community, Turkey, much like Germany, has faced criticism for its reliance on Russia. Nonetheless, Turkey and Germany, as NATO allies, exhibit starkly divergent strategies in their approaches to natural gas procurement and energy security. Reflecting Turkey’s balancing act in its natural gas policy, Ankara has historically pursued a multidimensional foreign policy that is sensitive to price fluctuations and geopolitical shifts from the Black Sea to Europe.

This approach began in earnest in 1986 under then-President Turgut Özal, whose neoliberal vision led to market-driven strategies that reshaped Turkey’s natural gas trade mindset. A decisive point was reached in 1987, when the state-owned BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation initiated its first gas imports from the USSR, marking the start of Turkey’s strategy to procure natural gas internationally. This was followed in 1988 by the beginning of LNG purchases from Algeria, diversifying further in 1995 with a long-term LNG contract with Nigeria at Marmara Ereğlisi, Turkey’s first LNG terminal. The deal with Nigeria is widely believed to have been insurance in case of Russian gas cuts.

Turkey’s natural gas procurement history contrasts strongly with Germany’s energy policy, which has been centered on Russian natural gas and offered limited alternatives like LNG infrastructure. Germany’s dependence was highlighted during Russia’s irredentist moves in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, and lastly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, delineating the vulnerabilities inherent in this reliance. Germany’s turning point came quite late, in 2022, when it implemented the EU Toolbox, REPowerEU, and the Green Deal to diversify its energy sources and develop LNG capabilities.

Amid the varied landscape of energy strategies, it is essential to underscore that Turkey distinctly avoided the trade of strategic equipment, such as Germany’s pipe-for-gas strategy, which set the stage for advancing Russian influence in Europe through its pipelines and storage facilities. For more than fifty years, Turkey’s multidimensional approach has been a cornerstone of state policy, beginning with engagement with international markets in the 1980s. This strategy effectively melds considerations of price rationality and ongoing geopolitical risk assessment, integrating them in the foreign-policymaking process through a meticulously managed balancing act. (See Part 1 for more on diplomacy and dialogue.)

In line with this balancing act, Turkey expanded its LNG import capabilities and infrastructure, demonstrating a proactive and versatile approach that has been adaptable to price volatility since the first day of its natural gas procurement. This multidimensional strategy has always ensured flexibility and security in its energy supply and underlined Turkey’s aim of diversifying its energy sources without becoming dependent on fixed infrastructural ties, the dangers of which can be seen in Germany’s delayed response to diversifying away from Russian natural gas infrastructure.

Turkey’s policy and interests in the Black Sea region

From the 1980s to the 2020s, Turkey’s natural gas policy has consistently involved incorporating delicate balancing acts into its contracts with other nations. Between 2010 and 2023, under the leadership of Hakan Fidan at the National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı; MIT), Turkey demonstrably enhanced the technical capabilities of its foreign operations within the security sector, making the security bureaucracy one of the key decision-makers of foreign policy. In June 2023, Fidan was named minister of foreign affairs.

Fidan’s vision for Turkish foreign policy is informed by the concept of complex adaptive systems, leading him to move away from traditional definitions of international systems, whether unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. He views the international system’s complexity as a call for agile policymaking, a strategy that echoes Özal’s nuanced approach. Notably, Özal advanced Turkey’s strategic interests by securing pipeline gas agreements with the USSR while diversifying energy sources (e.g., LNG imports, Marmara Ereğli terminal). Fidan, too, combines in-depth geopolitical analysis with a systematic decision-making process, skillfully addressing both economic and security challenges.

Prompted by geopolitical tensions originating in Syria after Turkey downed an SU-24 type Russian jet in 2015, a critical reassessment of the nation’s substantial reliance on Russian gas, which had previously constituted over 50 percent of its total gas imports, became a focal point of Turkish foreign policy.

This strategic reconsideration sparked a vigorous public and governmental debate, which in turn accelerated significant investments in Turkey’s LNG import infrastructure. In this vein, the transmission capacity of Turkey’s natural gas networks has expanded, with current daily gas entry capacity exceeding four hundred thousand cubic meters (mcm) daily. Turkey is actively working to increase its natural gas storage capacity to at least 20 percent of its annual consumption.

Significant steps in this direction include the deployment of three floating storage regasification units (FSRUs) and upgrades to the total capacities at LNG terminals, now totaling approximately 156 mcm per day. These developments are also in line with the goals set forth by Turkey’s Ministry of Energy, led by Alparslan Bayraktar, following the election last year, to further secure the nation’s energy supply and diversify its sources, ultimately aiming to elevate total capacity to over 500 mcm per day from 2023 onwards.

Since 2015, Turkey has decisively shifted away from an overdependence on Russian gas. Nonetheless, the implications of Turkey’s balancing act in natural gas contracts may vary in response to price fluctuations and geopolitical assessments, as can be observed in the comparative supply strategies between 2020-21 and 2021-23.

Rising through the ranks of LNG importers in Europe (2020-21)

Turkey’s development of its LNG infrastructure facilitates the implementation of its balancing act in natural gas contracts, enabling it to sign LNG contracts along with pipelines. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2021, Turkey’s approach to securing its natural gas needs via LNG contracts was notably a consequence of its traditional policy of price rationality. In accordance with that policy, Turkey positioned itself as the fourth-largest LNG importer in Europe with an increase of 1.3 million metric tons in 2020.

This positioning entailed a shift toward spot market purchases rather than long-term commitments, as global gas prices plummeted due to decreased demand on production cycles. During that time of pandemic lockdowns, Turkey capitalized on these lower prices to enhance its energy security without binding itself to long-term agreements. The flexibility of relying on spot market LNG allowed Turkey to manage its energy costs effectively during a period of high economic and global uncertainty.

Adapting to market shifts brought piped gas to the fore (2021-23)

From 2021 to 2023, Turkey shifted its natural gas procurement strategy, increasingly favoring contracts through pipelines with suppliers like Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. In 2022, the total volume of natural gas imports to Turkey reached 54.66 bcm, with a substantial 72.25 percent being transported via pipelines. This reflects a strong preference for pipeline-based deliveries over LNG, which accounted for only 27.75 percent of imported natural gas.

By 2023, this preference was evident as Russia became Turkey’s predominant energy supplier, providing 59.14 percent of its energy imports by October, according to data from the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu; EPDK). The shift in a very short period from LNG to pipeline contracts was a clear demonstration of Turkey’s balancing act in a multidimensional era, addressing the complexity of economic and security challenges. It also showcased Turkey’s agile approach to the consistently changing international system. This shift was driven by a combination of factors, including energy market price stabilization, increased demand in the LNG sector, and a gradual increase in natural gas prices.

Examining the nuances of Turkey’s current energy policy

To fully understand the implications of Turkey’s balancing act in natural gas procurement, it is essential to examine the broader context and current dynamics of the Turkish natural gas and energy market. Turkey’s energy policy has undergone a significant evolution across two distinct phases, as defined by Bayraktar, each designed to effectively respond to both global shifts and domestic needs.

Energy transition 1.0: Liberalization and privatization (2002-17)

The initial phase began with the ascent of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) to power in 2002, focusing on liberalizing and privatizing the energy sector. This era ushered in over $60 billion in investments, dismantled monopolistic structures, and cultivated a more transparent and competitive market, thereby enhancing innovation and efficiency.

Energy transition 2.0: Localization, improvement, market predictability (2017-23)

This second phase prioritized enhancing the security of supply, localization, and market predictability. During this period, Turkey significantly expanded its LNG capabilities, incorporated new infrastructure such as FSRUs, and made a major natural gas discovery in the Sakarya gas field, all of which substantially strengthened domestic resources and supply security. Despite these advancements, challenges persisted, notably the continued dominance of state-owned BOTAS in the natural gas sector, which impacted market liquidity and predictability.

Energy transition 3.0: Decarbonization, decentralization, digitalization, and diversity (2023-35)

Currently, under the continual impacts of global regulations on energy markets, some industry experts, including myself, argue that Turkey is in the midst of a third phase, dubbed the smart energy transition, which emphasizes decarbonization, decentralization, digitalization, and diversity (the 4Ds).

This phase aims to ensure secure energy supplies, diversify the energy mix, and position Turkey as a central energy hub between Asia and Europe. A significant objective within this framework is the development of green and blue hydrogen technologies, with a target of achieving five gigawatts (GW) of electrolyzer capacity by 2035, highlighting Turkey’s commitment to renewable and sustainable energy solutions.

Understanding the nuances of each transition era in Turkey’s energy policy is crucial to grasping the strategic shifts made as part of its balancing act and how they have shaped its current energy landscape. As Turkey continues to evolve its energy strategy, appreciating these nuances will be key to achieving a resilient and diversified energy future.

Potential areas of Turkish-European cooperation

Turkey and the EU are on the cusp of developing a deeply interconnected partnership, centered around natural gas and renewable energy sources, and set against a backdrop of shifting regional powers in the international arena. Despite the negative political climate that has persisted between the EU and Turkey for almost ten years, their commercial relations continue to strengthen, exemplifying a new model of bilateral governance marked by transactionalism.

Within this governance framework, Turkey’s strategic position as a NATO member enhances its role as a critical energy conduit between East and West, providing a unique opportunity to develop energy cooperation that could significantly impact energy security and economic interdependence throughout Europe.

Meanwhile, as Russia redirects its natural gas exports to new markets like China, India, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, in response to strained relations with European nations, Turkey continues to maintain strong natural gas trade links with both Russia and the EU.

Despite Russia’s attempts to overtake Turkey’s cultural and political ties with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to establish alternative gas routes, the robustness of Turkey’s trade relationships emphasizes its key role in the global energy market.

In this geopolitical setting, this intricate chessboard showcases Turkey’s balancing act, as it incrementally challenges Russian market dominance in Europe by negotiating lower gas prices, while serving as a crucial conduit for transporting piped gas through both the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which are carrying only Azerbaijani gas being produced in Shah Deniz field and non-Russian LNG to Europe through non-Russian agreements.

At this juncture, Turkey’s delicate balance between these dynamics not only demonstrates its capacity for multidimensional governance, but also has the potential to diminish Russia’s influence in global markets over the long term as a unique member of the Alliance.

Integrating Black Sea and European energy security: Turkey’s strategic influence

Turkey’s energy policy, including leveraging natural gas and renewables, holds strategic importance. Establishing a Turkey-EU natural gas trade axis could diminish Russian influence/control over Eastern and Central Europe while improving and formalizing relations with the EU, potentially opening doors to cooperative ventures in renewable energy. At this point, opening an energy chapter for official negotiations on EU accession will help both sides further harmonize energy regulatory frameworks as well as energy policies. Focusing on enhancing stability in the broader Black Sea region through natural gas, Turkey (via BOTAS) has secured significant natural gas export agreements since 2022 with several Eastern and Central European countries including Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and potentially Greece through the Bulgarian agreement.
 
Building on this strategy, BOTAS aimed to secure new natural gas export agreements by leveraging its infrastructure investments, advanced transmission system, geographical location, and robust infrastructure to meet the natural gas demand of Eastern and Central Europe. As part of this strategy, BOTAS and Moldova’s East Gas Energy Trading agreed to export two million cubic meters of natural gas daily to Moldova starting in September 2023. This translates to approximately 0.73 bcm annually, or about 25 percent of Moldova’s annual natural gas consumption.
 
Similarly, Turkey’s strategy to secure Central European energy and increase Romania’s energy resiliency against Russian influence resulted in another export deal with Romania in October 2023. This agreement permits the supply of up to four million cubic meters of natural gas per day, and will expire in March 2025. Under this deal, Turkey contributes approximately 1.46 bcm annually to Romania, constituting about 12 percent of Romania’s annual natural gas consumption.
 
On the other hand, BOTAS and Hungarian state-owned energy company MVM signed another crucial natural gas export deal in August 2023, marking Turkey’s first nonbordering recipient of natural gas exports. Even though portions are small, it is a remarkable event in terms of Hungary’s efforts to diversify gas import sources.

The most significant agreement to boost Turkey’s commercial influence in the Black Sea regional energy markets is with Bulgaria. In January 2023, Turkey and Bulgaria, via Bulgargaz, sealed a comprehensive thirteen-year agreement enabling the annual transmission of up to 1.5 bcm. This deal, which supplied approximately 50 percent of Bulgaria’s natural gas consumption in 2023, also grants Bulgargaz access to this capacity at Turkish LNG terminals, notably the new FSRU Saros terminal, with the gas transported through Turkey’s network to the Turkish-Bulgarian border.

Turkey’s economic collaborations with European countries, particularly the littoral nations of the Black Sea like Bulgaria and Romania, underline the establishment of a strategic cooperation to curb Russian commercial influence. This cooperation model could even pave the way for the reactivation of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline (TBP) with a reverse gas flow, further entrenching the alliance in a complex interdependent manner.

In this context, as a policy option, the reverse flow of the TBP—which would allow gas to move from the south to the north, bypassing Russia—could be utilized to strengthen cooperation through pipelines. This would require technical modifications, such as installing bidirectional compressors, an area where Turkey has the necessary expertise and infrastructure knowledge. This policy option would reduce the geopolitical leverage of a single supplier, like Russia, over transit countries. For instance, Turkey could leverage this capability to act as a gas hub, redistributing gas from its LNG terminals or Azerbaijani and/or Turkmen supplies to Europe, further enhancing the region’s energy flexibility and security.

Turkey’s LNG terminals, including the Etki FSRU (28 mcm/day), Marmara Ereğlisi LNG terminal (35 mcm/day), Egegaz LNG terminal (40 mcm/day), Dörtyol FSRU (28 mcm/day), and Saros FSRU (25 mcm/day), collectively contribute to a capacity of 156 mcm/day. This extensive capacity, coupled with Turkey’s idle capacity of approximately 15 bcm, positions it to supply LNG to Slovenia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively. This is a window of opportunity for Turkey’s advanced LNG infrastructure to play a crucial role.

Conclusion and energy policy recommendations

Turkey plays—and will continue to play—a crucial role in supporting the energy security of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European countries. This strategic contribution not only enhances these countries’ energy resiliency against Russia’s commercial influence, but also strengthens a more stable Black Sea region as Turkey, the transit country, emerges as NATO’s second-largest army. Turkey’s recent gas export agreements with Moldova, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria underline its commitment and capacity to act as a key energy supplier and gas hub in the region.

Recommendations

1. Increase the capacity of TAP/TANAP: Turkey’s transportation of non-Russian gas contracts to Europe aligns with Europe’s 2027 targets. To support this alignment, efforts should be made to increase the pipeline capacity of TANAP and TAP. This involves raising the current capacity from 16 bcm to 31 bcm to facilitate the transportation of non-Russian gas to Europe via Turkey, thereby enhancing the continent’s energy security and reducing reliance on Russian gas.
2. Expand Black Sea energy cooperation: Turkey could further broaden its natural gas export agreements and strategic partnerships with Eastern and Central European countries in the Black Sea region, thereby diminishing Russian influence and solidifying its role as an energy hub in the European energy markets.
3. Maximize production from the Sakarya gas field: Turkey’s first deepwater gas field discovery is expected to significantly increase its production capacity from 3.5 bcm to 14 bcm in its second phase. This field should be developed as a key resource for supplying natural gas to Eastern and Central European countries, contributing to regional energy diversification and security.
4. Enable renewal of the Turkey-Greece interconnector: In 2023, Greece’s total natural gas consumption was 6.38 bcm. The Turkey-Greece interconnector, which transported 0.75 bcm, accounted for approximately 11.75 percent of Greece’s total consumption. To ensure continued support and normalization of energy relations, the Turkey-Greece interconnector agreement should be renewed.
5. Enable reverse flow of Trans-Balkan Pipeline for regional security: Prioritize completing the technical modifications of this pipeline to enable reverse flow capabilities, facilitating the transport of natural gas from the south to the north and enhancing regional energy security.
6. Secure Central Europe via Turkish LNG: Given Turkey’s advanced LNG infrastructure and significant idle capacity, there is an opportunity to enhance energy supply diversification for Central European countries such as Slovenia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7. Integrate small modular reactors to diversify Turkey’s nuclear energy security supply: To ensure energy security and reduce dependency on Russian nuclear power, Turkey should urgently prioritize integrating small modular reactors into its nuclear energy supplies, targeting an additional minimum 5 GW capacity.
8. Enhance investments in renewable energy in alignment with the EU’s Green Deal: Joint ventures between Turkey and the EU in renewable energy projects, including wind, solar, and green hydrogen, will diversify both regions’ energy mixes and significantly reduce carbon emissions. This strategy aligns with the EU’s Green Deal, which aims to achieve at least 45 percent of energy from renewable sources by 2030, while reducing dependence on Russian gas.
9. Use Turkey’s strategic position to create new natural gas commercialization routes: To enhance regional energy security and support the EU’s REPowerEU plan, Turkey should capitalize on its geopolitical position by developing and commercializing natural gas routes from Turkmenistan, northern Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean. This diversification would reduce dependence on Russian gas, for both Turkey and Europe, and foster both regional stability and economic integration.
10. Strengthen collaboration between Turkey’s EPDK and the EU’s ACER: To enhance regulatory frameworks and operational efficiency in energy markets, EPDK and ACER should bolster their ongoing cooperation by focusing on joint technical workshops, personnel exchange programs, collaborative research projects, and capacity-building initiatives, thereby supporting energy market integration, security, and the adoption of renewable technologies in alignment with the EU’s Green Deal and Turkey’s energy transition goals.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Main takeaways and policy recommendations.”

About the author

Eser Özdil today bases his expertise on one and half decades of business experience. As part of his professional portfolio, Mr. Özdil is responsible of management GLOCAL Consulting, Investment & Trade, where he is competently advising top energy companies on public policy, government relations and commercial diplomacy, commercial due diligence, strategy and business development, mergers & acquisitions,  investment and trade. Between 2012 and 2020, Mr. Özdil worked as Secretary General at Petroleum and Natural Gas Platform Association (PETFORM) based in Ankara, Turkey. Prior to PETFORM, he worked at various regional associations and think-tanks. Prior to PETFORM, he worked at various regional associations and think-tanks. Mr. Özdil participated in various official meetings of international organizations, namely Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), European Union, World Bank, OECD, IEA, EFET, and IGU. Özdil recently joined IVLP (International Visitor Leadership Program), the global public diplomacy program run by the U.S. Department of State. He is also a member of the BMW Foundation Responsible Leaders Network and Non-Resident Fellow of Atlantic Council.

Follow the conversation on X, formerly known as Twitter, with @AC_TRprograms and @AtlanticCouncil using #ACTurkey

Further reading

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Image: Saipem’s pipelay vessel Castorone sails in the Bosphorus on its way to the Black Sea, in Istanbul, Turkey July 5, 2022. REUTERS/Yoruk Isik

_{Images are for reference only.Images and contents gathered automatic from google or 3rd party sources.All rights on the images and contents are with their legal original owners.}