Is Bihar’s high replacement rate a consequence of poverty?

According to the Sample Registration System report for 2021 released by the Registrar General of India on May 7, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is the average number of children that a woman is expected to have in her childbearing years, in India was 2.0 in 2021, the same as in 2020. While Delhi and West Bengal reported the lowest TFR of 1.4, Bihar reported the highest at 3.0. Is Bihar’s high replacement rate a consequence of poverty? Saswata Ghosh and Prasenjit Bose discuss the question in a conversation moderated by Shiv Sahay Singh . Edited excerpts:

What does a TFR rate of 3.0 mean for Bihar? Does it have any association with poverty?

Saswata Ghosh: The TFR has hovered around 3.0 for the last 6-7 years in Bihar. According to the Expert Committee on Population Projection, Bihar will achieve the replacement level of fertility (2.1) only in in 2039. Bihar is the only laggard State in terms of the fertility transition.

Bihar’s infant mortality rate has actually declined and stands at 27 per 1,000 live births from 42 in the past. Other indicators such as women’s educational attainment have improved as well, but the State’s TFR remains high. High TFR has some linkage with poverty. But poverty is not the only reason for it. In Bihar, there is a culture of high fertility. As per calculations made of unique level data of the National Family Health Survey of 2019-21, across the country, 67% of women said that the ideal number of children for them is two, whereas in Bihar, only 49.6% of women said so.

There are a number of government reports, including NITI Aayog’s Multidimensional Poverty Index, which state that poverty in Bihar is also declining. But despite the improvement in the poverty rate, the fertility rate in Bihar continues to be high.

Prasenjit Bose: These are complex socio-economic questions and the multi-dimensional poverty estimates themselves are far from perfect. I agree with Saswata that cultural factors have an important causality in determining fertility rates. But I would also like to add that there are other economic factors in terms of urbanisation, employment opportunities, and livelihood opportunities, which are not really captured by the MDP (multidimensional poverty) estimates. Therefore, I would not read much into this divergence between TFR and MDP. It could be over simplistic in understanding a complex phenomenon. Ultimately both the estimates are moving in the same direction — poverty is coming down and so is the TFR.

The SRS figures make a distinction between urban and rural TFR. Across the country, the urban TFR is 1.6 and the rural TFR is 2.2. Is there a wide gap between the TFR in the urban areas of Bihar, which stands at 2.3, and in the rural areas, pegged at 3.1?

SG: If we see the gap between the TFR of rural areas and urban areas across the country, it is 0.6 percentage points, whereas in Bihar, the gap is 0.8 points. There isn’t a big difference between 0.6 and 0.8. But what is startling is that the all-India urban TFR is 1.6, while in Bihar it is 2.3. That is puzzling. Why is the TFR so high in urban areas, where the affluent and educated sections of society live? Why is it above the replacement level of fertility?

The demographer Ansley J. Coale had said that human fertility behaviour is a ‘calculus of conscious choice’. So if the fertility rate is higher than elsewhere, it is because of the conscious choice of the people. Even if the infant mortality rate has declined and there is higher use of contraception, if the fertility in urban areas continues to remain high, it is a conscious choice. Until and unless the people think that low fertility size is actually beneficial for them, the TFR will continue to be high in Bihar.

Do factors such as a preference for sons, the State being primarily an agricultural economy, and having a relatively small female workforce affect the TFR?

PB: Yes, significantly. In fact, poverty and lack of livelihood and income opportunities have a huge impact on cultural choices, including the number of children people have. Poor people tend to have a cultural preference not only for sons, but for more children. They want more labour, which will lead to more income. Poverty has been the reason why the fertility rate has historically been high everywhere. Cultural choices are intricately linked to the process of social and economic development. But in the case of Bihar, I would specifically point to a few economic factors. Despite being large, Bihar is among the least industrialised States. There is surplus labour and migration, which are related to the question of very high degrees of illiteracy and a dysfunctional primary education system.

The literacy rate in Bihar, particularly the female literacy rate, remains low. In the 2011 Census, female literacy was about 53%. Is there a direct correlation between female literacy and TFR or fertility?

SG: Chief Minister Nitish Kumar has consistently pointed out that if we educate women, the fertility rate will go down. He has announced many schemes for girl students, including providing bicycles for them. There is a positive correlation not only between education and TFR, but also between household affluence and higher educational attainment. Upper caste and somewhat affluent households generally send at least one son for higher education to better off regions. However, in affluent and landed households in rural areas, the parents prefer at least one son to stay back with them to take care of their property and support them. So, families ideally prefer two sons. If we look at the data more carefully, we will find that among those who say the ideal number of children is three, 88.2% want two sons. However, since the probability of having two sons successively is only about 26.4% according to a paper by Clark in 2000, a significant share of families ultimately end up with a large family size.

Professor Ghosh, in one of your papers, you had pointed out how mother-in-laws act as mediators between women of reproductive age and ASHA workers who visit them during pregnancy. Can you shed more light on this?

SG:Women are getting educated more and more. Several programmes in this regard are being implemented by the State government. Many of these women are first-generation learners. But they have low employability and their exposure to the outside world is limited. They have lower bargaining power and autonomy in the family, and social mobility. In our study, based on a primary survey of 2,250 women in six districts in Bihar, we found that women in the reproductive age group of 15-49 years were not allowed to directly interact with ASHA workers. These interactions were restricted by their mother-in-laws.

We have empirical evidence now that certain States in the north have a high fertility rate while the fertility rate is declining in the south. Where does this lead us to, particularly in the political context, with the question of delimitation looming large?

PB: I don’t think that this problem should be discussed only in the context of Bihar, but also other States in what we call the Hindi heartland — Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. These States now account for a disproportionately large share of the country’s overall population. We have a system of representative democracy where ‘one person, one vote, one value’ is a basic principle. As the delimitation debate opens up, which is likely to happen only after the next Census, we will come across a hugely disproportionate size of parliamentary and Assembly constituencies across the north and the south. We will come across parliamentary constituencies in States with a high TFR with a disproportionately large number of people (25 lakh to 30 lakh voters) being represented by a single MP, whereas the case will be different in States where the TFR is already low or is showing a falling trend. The question is whether they (the States with low/declining TFR) are going to pay the price for bringing down the TFR rate. Will they get rewarded or punished for social and economic progress and policy successes? Because the allocation of resources by the Finance Commission is based on the population size. The onus is on policymakers to bring about some course correction and bring in a convergent trend. If the divergent trend (between States with a high TFR and low TFR) continues, we are looking at a disaster which could pose serious questions for our democracy.

Saswata Ghosh is Associate Professor at the Institute of Development Studies, Kolkata.

Prasenjit Bose is Economist and activist.

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