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The parliamentary election in Moldova on 28 September is crucial for the country and will test its fragile democratic system, its European Union (EU) future, and Russia’s ability to suck countries back into its orbit and undermine their democracy.
For Russia, the vote is a must-win issue, as it is the last viable chance to halt Moldova’s decoupling and prevent Moldova’s EU accession and democratic consolidation. Russia, weakened by its war of choice in Ukraine, sees the country as key to maintaining influence in southeastern Europe and as part of its sphere of influence. Its position on the western side of Ukraine and the eastern side of the EU’s common frontier makes it an alluring target.
That explains the enormous lengths it’s going to go in the hope of swaying the result in favor of pro-Kremlin parties. The pro-European President Maia Sandu warned on September 9 that the election was the country’s most important. “It is a race against time — to anchor our democracy inside the Union, where it will be protected from the greatest threat we face: Russia,” she said. Moldova says Russia is pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into an influence and vote-buying campaign.
Both Moldovan and international independent media have reported widespread Russian-backed schemes, including training pro-Kremlin Moldovans for street violence, and payments through cryptocurrencies made by banks linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
For the EU, the elections are both a test of its credibility as a geopolitical and regional power and supporter of the current government, and of its ability to anchor Moldova’s democratic transformation and reform process. The bloc’s limits and lack of a decisive response have been starkly illustrated by Georgia’s decision to turn away from Brussels and toward Moscow, despite a hugely pro-Western population.
Moldovan society is economically vulnerable, and the war has worsened the economic situation of the country. The reform promises that brought the ruling PAS party into government have only partially materialized, derailed in some cases by external crises, which slowed down the promised transformation. Economic grievances and poverty play a central role, as does the legacy of supposedly pro-EU governments in the past that were corrupt and kleptocratic. While the EU approved its largest Moldovan aid and loan program totaling €1.8bn ($2.1bn) earlier this year, the positive effects will take time to materialize.
These factors have been instrumentalized and amplified by Russian influence campaigns and propaganda, and manipulation, which uses these grievances to blame PAS for the country’s ills. At the same time, the external pressures and security concerns have kept the government busy. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldova has faced intensified pressure from Russian hybrid threats, cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and energy blackmail.
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Even so, the country of 2.4 million has advanced in its EU accession process. Having gained candidate status alongside Ukraine in June 2022, Moldova has opened accession talks and completed the screening process. The past three and a half years have been marked by a government racing against time to move the EU accession process forward, deter Russian destabilization, and manage relations with the EU and support Ukraine, while taking a firmer stance against Russia.
The Kremlin’s objective is clear. It is to prevent Moldova’s EU accession, foster corruption, and weaken institutions to aid its interference. Weak institutions are Russia’s best ally as they make Moldovan politics more volatile, elections easier to influence, and the democratic path unstable. A weak Moldova would also support Russia’s goals in Ukraine and could be used to weaken Ukraine.
Following Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, Moldova significantly decreased its energy and economic dependence on Russia, while the Kremlin fought back using the shadow war playbook it has developed over decades.
For the EU, Moldova is both an investment and a credibility test. By opening accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova in 2024, the EU also signaled that the era of the greyzone is over. Having a reliable partner in Moldova, which the current government represents, is also important for the EU’s support for Ukraine, as well as for regional stability and connectivity. Moldova can become a success story of the EU normative power and enlargement.
The EU has invested heavily in Moldova. That’s partly through the €1.8bn Moldova Growth Plan, but also with high-level visits, including the Moldova–EU summit and the Weimar triangle leaders visit, which demonstrated further political support for the Moldovan government. Still, EU accession remains coupled with Ukraine, and Moldova has not yet opened the first cluster of “fundamentals”. This slowness undermines EU credibility in the long term, both in Moldova and Ukraine.
Underlying this is a stark and not very encouraging truth. Despite high levels of assistance, including hard cash, the EU’s considerable efforts cannot compare with the calculated and destructive tools used by autocratic regimes, which rely on manipulation and eye-catching lies. This makes the task of PAS and the EU much harder.
The best outcome of the election would be the last “crucial” vote, and that Moldova casts aside Russia’s cynical efforts to end its Europeanization process.
Moldova’s aim to join the EU by 2030 might be overly ambitious, especially given the inherent slowness of the bloc’s processes, but even at the current speed of advance, Moldova can make quick progress while assured of political and financial support to deal with energy and economic crises. Make no mistake, the Kremlin will do everything to stop this process.
Anastasia Pociumban is a research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). She works in its Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, where she leads the Eastern Partnership Think Tank Network. Her work focuses on the impact of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine on regional dynamics in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. She was also a CEPA Denton Fellow (2024.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Europe’s Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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