Original Coverage & Source Attribution: shafaq.com
2026-11-06T14:20:24+00:00
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Shafaq News- OPINION
By Ali Hussein Feyli*
With nearly 40
officially registered political parties active in the Kurdistan Region and
regional pressures continuing to shape its choices, President Nechirvan
Barzani’s quiet diplomacy and “strategic patience” have been more than
political luxuries. They have helped preserve the Kurdistan Region’s delicate
political balance and guard against collapse.
From the perspective
of decision-making centers in Baghdad, regional capitals and international
powers, this pragmatic approach has often been viewed as a reliable channel for
building dialogue and untangling difficult political disputes. At times when polarization
and entrenched positions have dominated the region, efforts to emphasize
moderation, reason and constitutional frameworks have helped reinforce the
Kurdistan Region’s image, from the perspective of this approach, as a stable
region and an active partner in containing regional tensions.
The same method has
appeared historically in the handling of several sensitive periods, from easing
the consequences of difficult political crises to maintaining a balance among
competing forces and dealing pragmatically with external factors that threatened
the Kurdistan Region’s existence as a political entity. While other actors have
at times resorted to confrontational rhetoric and emotional reactions, this
approach has sought to preserve a margin of safety capable of sustaining the
Kurdistan Region as a political entity.
Yet a closer
examination of governance and administration reveals a clear contrast between
external and internal performance, reflecting the different environments in
which the Kurdistan Region President operates. While the external arena
provides greater room for political maneuvering, the domestic arena remains
constrained by structural problems and entrenched party influence within state
institutions. The limits on President Nechirvan Barzani’s effective authority
have prevented him from fully exercising the presidency’s legal powers,
including those related to the general command of the armed forces and security
institutions, prompting him instead to assume a mediating role and work to
contain tensions to avoid further internal confrontation.
The existence of
multiple centers of influence and competing interests among the main political
forces has further complicated efforts to strengthen the presidency as an
institution capable of bringing different sides together, while limiting the
prospects for reconciliation and narrowing the space for bridging political
differences.
Alongside these
political challenges, the Kurdistan Region’s unproductive rentier economy
remains a deep structural problem. Heavy dependence on oil revenues, recurring
financial crises, growing pressure on public employees and salary earners, and
delays in implementing fundamental reforms have imposed significant material
and psychological burdens on society and contributed to declining public
confidence in institutions.
This reality has
largely confined the internal political process to temporary settlements and
the containment of crises rather than structural reforms capable of addressing
the causes of existing imbalances.
The paradox, however,
is that the same strategic patience that has helped preserve the Kurdistan
Region’s external balances could become a factor in prolonging domestic crises
if it remains limited to de-escalation without reform. The constraints facing President
Nechirvan Barzani cannot be separated from the shared political responsibility
of the forces governing the Kurdistan Region, as the problem is not whether one
individual can contain disputes, but whether the political parties are prepared
to overcome these obstacles, unify institutions and decision-making centers,
and move from managing crises to addressing their underlying causes.
As the region enters
another period marked by uncertainty and risk, the diplomatic approach pursued
today by the Kurdistan Region President faces three immediate challenges that
raise questions over how far it can continue to operate effectively:
The first is a
shrinking margin for political maneuvering amid sharper regional polarization
and external interference, which increasingly limits the Kurdistan Region’s
ability to make independent decisions while maintaining balanced relations with
competing powers.
The second is
continued pressure from Baghdad through financial entitlements and the salary
and budget files, which are used as instruments of leverage and have left
constitutional talks and negotiations moving in repeated cycles without
producing sustainable understandings.
The third is a
fundamental shift in domestic expectations, as moderate political discourse
becomes less aligned with the accelerating demands of younger generations and
growing frustration over the slow pace of reform leads parts of society to view
prolonged strategic patience with increasing skepticism.
These conditions offer
lessons from earlier experience. Diplomacy and strategic patience remain
important tools for avoiding collapse in an environment marked by risk and
surrounded by centers of tension, while maintaining the role of a rational
mediator during crises can give the Kurdistan Region significant political and
geographic weight. Yet developing the mechanisms through which the Kurdistan
Region manages its affairs, with all their political and partisan complexities,
cannot rest on one individual regardless of his political or diplomatic
abilities.
When administrative
and economic problems accumulate and institutions remain constrained by
competing centers of influence and partisan calculations, the Kurdistan Region
faces a decisive test between external pressures and the demands of internal
reform. Here lies the importance of the equation President Nechirvan Barzani
presents in this context: however effective external diplomacy may be, it
cannot substitute for strengthening domestic legitimacy and rebuilding public
confidence in the Kurdistan Region’s institutions.
* Ali Hussein Feyli,
Chairman of the Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media and former member of
the Kurdistan Region Parliament.
This article was
originally written in Arabic.
