Original Coverage & Source Attribution: thearabweekly.com
Altaf Moti
Satellite internet was once presented as a way to connect remote communities beyond the reach of conventional networks. Today, it has become something more consequential: an instrument that can influence wars, support political movements and extend a government’s strategic reach without deploying troops.
The clearest example is Starlink, the satellite internet service operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. Its growing role in Ukraine, Iran and other conflict zones reveals a fundamental change in US foreign policy. Washington can now pursue strategic objectives through privately owned infrastructure in space, while decisions about access may rest partly with a company executive rather than with elected officials.
The result is a new form of power. The ability to connect, restrict or disconnect a population can carry consequences comparable to those of more traditional instruments of statecraft.
- A determining factor in Ukraine
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated the military value of satellite internet. As Russian attacks damaged terrestrial communications infrastructure, Starlink helped Ukrainian authorities maintain connectivity and keep essential services operating.
Its importance extended well beyond civilian communications. Ukrainian forces used the network to coordinate units, exchange battlefield information and support drone operations. A commercial service had become part of the country’s military infrastructure.
Yet this dependence created a strategic vulnerability. Ukraine could possess its own soldiers, weapons and military objectives while remaining dependent on a foreign company for a critical communications link.
In October 2026, controversy over restrictions on Starlink access for Ukrainian military operations brought this problem into sharp focus. The disruption reportedly affected frontline communications and drone missions before service was restored. Elon Musk said SpaceX had restricted speeds following concerns about the use of its civilian service for offensive drone strikes. He also distinguished Starlink from Starshield, the military-oriented system whose restrictions he said were controlled by the US government.
The episode exposed an uncomfortable reality: technological dependence can limit a country’s freedom of military action even when its political leadership retains full sovereignty over its armed forces.
- Internet access as political leverage in Iran
The implications extend beyond conventional warfare. In Iran, satellite connectivity has offered an alternative when authorities restricted access to the global internet.
Following protests that began in 2022, the Biden administration supported measures to facilitate access to communication technologies for Iranians. Starlink terminals subsequently entered the country through unofficial channels. During later unrest and internet shutdowns, satellite connections helped some users transmit images and information beyond government censorship.
In 2026, the Trump administration also reportedly discussed activating Starlink access in Iran following US-Israeli strikes, with the aim of improving connectivity amid political turmoil. These efforts illustrate how a commercial communications network can become part of a broader strategy intended to influence an adversary’s domestic information environment.
The political implications are significant. Connectivity can help citizens document abuses, communicate and obtain independent information. However, providing internet access does not automatically produce political change. Governments can respond with jamming, surveillance, arrests and restrictions on terminals.
Nor is satellite access politically neutral. When Washington helps facilitate a service that Tehran considers a threat to its authority, a technology company becomes entangled in a struggle over sovereignty, information and political legitimacy.
- Washington’s power—and its limits
The US government does not simply control every Starlink connection. SpaceX is a private company, and its decisions are shaped by commercial considerations, technical limitations, security concerns and the priorities of its leadership.
Nevertheless, Washington possesses considerable influence through government contracts, export controls, regulatory authority and security partnerships. Recent reporting by Reuters indicates that successive US administrations have asked SpaceX to activate or disable services in different countries, including efforts to prevent Iran-linked armed groups from accessing terminals and to expand connectivity for selected users.
This relationship offers Washington a potentially valuable instrument. Private infrastructure can support military partners, assist populations facing internet blackouts and advance US strategic interests without requiring the construction of a government-operated global network.
But the arrangement also creates uncertainty. Corporate decisions do not always match government choices. A company executive may restrict access to avoid escalation, protect commercial interests or enforce service conditions. A decision made in a boardroom can consequently affect military operations thousands of kilometres away.
The central question is no longer whether private companies influence foreign policy. It is how governments should manage that influence when national security depends on private company services.
- The double-edged nature of satellite power
The same technology that supports a country’s defence can also assist its adversaries. Terminals can be diverted, resold or obtained through unofficial networks. Armed groups may exploit commercial connectivity to coordinate operations, while governments may use the network to maintain communications when conventional infrastructure fails.
This dual-use character complicates the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure. A satellite connection can support a hospital, an independent journalist or a military drone operator. Restricting access may prevent misuse, but it can also disrupt essential civilian services.
Satellite internet also has technical vulnerabilities. Jamming, interference, physical attacks on ground equipment and cyber operations can undermine connectivity. It is not an invulnerable substitute for terrestrial networks or undersea cables.
For countries relying heavily on one provider, the absence of credible alternatives creates a concentration of strategic risk. Diversification, domestic capabilities and agreements governing access during emergencies are therefore essential.
The rise of satellite internet challenges established assumptions about sovereignty and accountability. Governments traditionally controlled military communications through state institutions. Today, crucial capabilities may depend on private networks whose decision-making processes are not fully transparent to the populations affected.
Washington must reconcile two objectives: using commercial technology to advance security and foreign-policy goals, while ensuring that decisions with major consequences are subject to clear rules and democratic oversight.
Other countries face a similar choice. They can develop alternative networks, negotiate enforceable service agreements and establish safeguards for civilian connectivity. International rules must also address the responsibilities of providers whose infrastructure serves both civilian and military users.
The private switch of war is no longer a distant possibility. It is already influencing how states communicate, fight and pursue political objectives.
The decisive question is whether governments can establish effective rules before dependence becomes vulnerability. In the conflicts of the future, control over territory and weapons will remain important. But control over the networks that connect armies, governments and societies may prove equally consequential.
