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How UK and EU sanctions and export controls affect company exposure to Russia and China

How UK and EU sanctions and export controls affect company exposure to Russia and China
Photo: U.S. Customs and Border Protection / Jerry Glaser, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
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Original Coverage & Source Attribution: ceoeconomy.com

Russia sanctions now reach suppliers in China, Central Asia and the Gulf, EU parents answer for foreign subsidiaries, and China’s own mineral curbs hang on a two-month reprieve.

European and British companies face Russia sanctions that increasingly run through third countries, especially China. The European Union’s 20th sanctions package, adopted on 23 April 2026, put tighter controls on exports of defense-related technology to 60 more entities, including companies in China and Hong Kong, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, China’s own controls on rare earths and related goods are suspended only until 10 January 2027.

The 20th package targets circumvention directly. According to the EU’s External Action Service, it designated 16 entities in China, the UAE, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus for supplying dual-use goods and weapons to Russia, banned four third-country banks, and listed a Kyrgyz crypto exchange that trades the A7A5 stablecoin. It barred EU companies from exporting CNC machine tools and certain radios to Kyrgyzstan because of re-export risk, banned netting arrangements used to evade sanctions, and prohibited transactions with the ports of Murmansk and Tuapse in Russia and Karimun in Indonesia. For the first time, a Chinese state-owned company was listed under the EU’s Belarus measures.

The package widened trade bans as well. It added export bans worth more than €360 million, covering items such as laboratory glassware, lubricants, chemicals, rubber, steel products and industrial tractors, and import bans worth more than €570 million on raw materials, metals, minerals and chemicals. Forty-six more vessels were banned from EU ports, taking the total to 632. A ban on LNG terminal services for Russian entities starts in January 2027, and the package created a legal basis for a future ban on maritime services for Russian oil, which is not yet in force.

Two EU rules reach beyond the bloc’s borders. Article 12g of Regulation 833/2014 requires EU exporters to include a no re-export to Russia clause in contracts for certain sensitive goods: aviation goods and jet fuel, firearms and items on the EU’s common high priority list. The clause must carry adequate remedies, and the Commission says exporters should not sell to any non-EU buyer that refuses to accept it.

The clause has been mandatory for contracts concluded from 19 December 2023 since 20 March 2024, and older contracts had to be amended for any performance from 1 January 2025. It does not apply to buyers in partner countries listed in Annex VIII: the US, Japan, the UK, South Korea, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Exporters must tell national authorities as soon as they learn of a breach.

The second rule concerns corporate groups. Since the 14th package, adopted on 24 June 2024, EU parent companies must undertake their best efforts to ensure that their subsidiaries outside the EU do not take part in activities that produce an outcome the sanctions seek to prevent. For a European group with operations in China, Türkiye or Central Asia, that means sanctions screening and controls at subsidiary level, not only at headquarters.

Britain has stepped up enforcement of trade sanctions. The Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, part of the Department for Business and Trade, launched in October 2024 and gained civil enforcement powers on 10 October 2024. It can impose penalties on a strict liability basis, using the civil standard of proof, of up to the greater of £1 million or 50% of the estimated value of the breach, and it can publicly name companies that breach the rules.

Strict liability matters in practice. A company does not need to have known it was breaching trade sanctions to be penalized, which puts weight on end-user checks, contract terms and red-flag reviews of orders routed through intermediaries in countries that border Russia or have become trading hubs.

China adds a second layer of risk, running the other way. China introduced licensing requirements for certain rare earths in April 2025 and expanded its controls in October 2025 to cover more items, including some industrial diamonds and lithium battery technology. Those expanded measures were paused for a year in November 2025 under a truce with Washington. On 9 November 2026 China’s Ministry of Commerce extended the suspension by two months to 10 January 2027, Reuters reported, as the two governments negotiate a lasting trade deal.

The suspension leaves companies that depend on Chinese magnets, battery materials or processing know-how exposed to a policy that could be reinstated at short notice. The same announcement round included a two-month suspension of China’s 24% tariff on US goods, while a 10% levy stayed in place, The National reported.

Mapping exposure means looking at both directions of trade: which products could end up in Russia through customers in third countries, which subsidiaries trade with listed entities or banks, and which inputs come from China under controls that are suspended rather than lifted.

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