Original Coverage & Source Attribution: euperspectives.eu
The EU can adopt common rules for all 27 member states. But when it comes to enforcement, each country plays by slightly different rules. And companies looking to get around sanctions can find openings in those differences.
Nearly five years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, consistently enforcing EU trade sanctions remains a challenge. Some countries carry out customs checks more rigorously than others. They interpret exemptions differently and do not always share information. As a result, weaker enforcement in one member state can undermine the efforts of the entire Union.
A new report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) highlights the problem. Auditors warn that differences between national practices create opportunities to circumvent trade sanctions. These sanctions form part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. But individual member states and their customs authorities bear much of the
This is where the auditors see a major weakness. “Divergences in member states’ practices create opportunities for ‘forum shopping’, which can facilitate circumvention,” the auditors write.
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The term forum shopping comes from the legal world. It describes how a claimant chooses the jurisdiction most likely to favour their interests. Applied more broadly, it means companies choosing where to do business based on the most favourable conditions, such as less stringent checks or a more lenient interpretation of sanctions rules. Such differences can make it easier to sidestep restrictions that should apply across the EU.
One set of rules, 27 different approaches
The problem is not simply that some countries are less willing to enforce the rules. Some national authorities also lack staff, technical equipment or administrative capacity. This affects how thoroughly they can monitor trade flows.
The wording of EU legislation adds another complication. Sanctions rules sometimes use different terminology from customs legislation. Some provisions are also ambiguous, leaving room for different interpretations.
Divergences in member states’ practices create opportunities for ‘forum shopping’, which can facilitate circumvention. — The European Court of Auditors
The auditors point to a paradox built into the negotiations themselves. Flexible wording can make it easier for member states to reach a political agreement. But in practice, it can also create loopholes that businesses can exploit.
“The trade-off is clear: it can lead to the uneven implementation of the measures and increase the risk that economic operators may be able to exploit loopholes across borders,” the report says. In other words, the very compromises that make common rules possible can also undermine their consistent application.
Sanctions are working
The auditors’ criticism does not mean EU sanctions are ineffective. Their impact on trade between the EU and Russia has been substantial. In 2025, total trade in goods between the two amounted to €58.1 billion, down from €257.5 billion in 2021. EU exports to Russia fell from €99 billion to €30.2 billion, a drop of 69 per cent. Imports from Russia declined even more sharply, falling 83 per cent from €163.6 billion to €27.9 billion.
According to European Commission estimates, export bans and restrictions on goods and technology had an economic impact of €49 billion by July 2026. Import restrictions accounted for approximately €110 billion.
The impact has been particularly significant on goods Russia needs for its military capabilities. Direct trade in critical and high-priority items, including dual-use goods, has almost come to a halt since 2023.
Moscow has nevertheless rerouted some supplies through third countries, particularly China. Sanctions have not stopped this trade altogether. Instead, they have changed its routes and made imports more expensive.
The EU is also trying to counter these practices through measures targeting sanctions circumvention. But their effectiveness varies. The auditors warn that the bloc does not always have sufficiently reliable data on trade flows between Russia and third countries. This makes it difficult to assess how far it has succeeded in curbing circumvention.
Brussels cannot enforce cooperation
Since the invasion began, the European Commission has built an extensive framework for cooperation. It issues guidance, answers questions from national authorities and runs systems for sharing information about suspicious trade transactions.
But the auditors say these efforts are not enough. Commission guidance is not legally binding. It therefore cannot guarantee a consistent approach across all member states.
Countries also make uneven use of information-sharing systems. Some customs authorities do not even have access to all central databases. This makes it harder to share intelligence about risky shipments and coordinate checks across borders.
The auditors also point to weak participation by some countries in joint coordination meetings. By the end of 2024, five member states had attended fewer than half the meetings of one key sanctions enforcement coordination mechanism. The report does not name the countries.
Who decides whether sanctions are working?
The auditors want the Commission to introduce clear criteria for assessing the effectiveness of trade sanctions. They also recommend regular evaluations based on those criteria. Current monitoring of trade flows and economic impact, they argue, does not show whether sanctions are actually limiting Russia’s ability to continue its war.
The Commission disagrees. It accepts the recommendation to improve data collection and analysis. However, it rejects the proposal for common criteria to assess the overall effectiveness of sanctions. Its argument is that sanctions are an instrument of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. Deciding whether they remain necessary or effective is therefore not simply a technical exercise.
“The assessments of their continued need, desirability or effectiveness are political, not technical in nature,” the Commission says in its response to the auditors. The Commission believes that member states and the Council of the EU should make the final judgement on their effectiveness.
The auditors have exposed weaknesses in a system designed to restrict Russia’s access to European technology and goods vital to its military industry. The Commission itself stresses that the system depends on cooperation from every member state.
And that is the central problem: a common sanctions policy can only be as effective as the countries responsible for enforcing it.
